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INTRODUCTION

Environmentalists can trace the development of an "environmental ethic" throughout much of Western history: from the
teachings of Saint Francis of Assisi,' to the poetry of Wordsworth, 2 the writings of Thoreau, 3 the early conservation efforts
of Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, 4 to the creation of
the Sierra Club by John Muir.5 Beginning in the 1960s, however,
the environmental movement in the United States took on an intensity and gained a public acceptance and support it had not
enjoyed previously.
By the first Earth Day on April 22, 1970, the American public
had generally come to understand, at the very least, that natural
resources are not limitless, and that industrial activities, land development and other human activities can cause irreparable
harm. The burgeoning American environmental movement enjoyed a number of landmark successes in this period. Local environmental groups formed throughout the nation to address local
problems. 6 National organizations, such as the Sierra Club, the
Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense
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Council brought lawsuits on a variety of environmental issues to
test the limits of environmental rights in the law. 7 The federal
Environmental Protection Agency was established in 1970.8 Beginning in 1970, with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 9 and throughout the rest of the decade, Congress
passed sweeping landmark legislation to address myriad environmental problems and concerns.'0
It became apparent to those involved in the development of
environmental law, however, that there is no explicit constitutional foundation-that is, a provision in the Constitution that
specifically guarantees a "clean and healthful" environment or
any other type of environmental right. Environmentalists reasoned that surely the right to drink pure water, to eat safe food,
and to breathe clean air must be a fundamental right of every
person." As part of the effort to expand environmental rights
under the law during this period, environmental scholars and activists attempted to read basic environmental rights into the Constitution. 2- Environmentalists looked to the long line of court
cases which have interpreted the basic rights contained in the
Bill of Rights. In a number of federal cases, they tested theories
that environmental rights are also protected by the
Constitution.3
This article examines efforts to extrude-or create outright-a
constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment. Part I
provides the legal background and summarizes the arguments
for reading environmental rights into the Constitution. Part II

7. See id.
8. See id. at 130; Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the
Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
311, 315-21 (1991).
9. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 43214370d (1994).
10. See SHABECOFF, supra note 5, at 131-35.
11. For citations to scholarly arguments for fundamental environmental rights, see WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENWIRONMENTAL LAw § 1.5,
at 62-67 (West Hornbook Ser. 1994).
12. See Rodger Schlickeisen, Symposium, Protecting Biodiversity For
Future Generations: An Argument for Constitutional Amendment, 8 TULANE

LJ. 181, 201-06 (1994).
13. See infra Parts I.B-C.

ENVTL.
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discusses past and present efforts to create an environmental
amendment to the Constitution. Part III discusses parallel efforts
to create analogous constitutional rights on the state level. The
article concludes with an assessment of future prospects.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Sierra Club v. Morton Decision

The Supreme Court decision in Sierra Club v. Morton14 came
close to holding that fundamental environmental rights exist
under the Constitution. The Sierra Club sought preliminary and
permanent injunctions to restrain federal officials, including the
Secretary of the Interior, Roger Morton, and the United States
Forest Service, from approving or issuing permits to allow Walt
Disney Enterprises, Inc. to proceed with a plan to build a ski resort on eighty acres of the Mineral King Valley, in the Sierra Ne15
vada Mountains, and adjacent to Sequoia National Park.
16
By a narrow plurality, the Court held against the Sierra Club.
It found that the Club lacked standing to sue in this case, because the Sierra Club had failed to allege in its pleadings and to
show by evidence that either the club or its members would be
"injured in fact" by the Disney development in the Mineral King
Valley. 17 Although ruling against the Sierra Club, the majority was
sympathetic to the Club's concern for the environment.1 8
In a vigorous dissent, with which Justices Blackmun and Brennan concurred, Justice Douglas argued that the Sierra Club had
alleged sufficient injury to have standing to sue. 19 He noted that
in its complaint the Sierra Club alleged "that '[o]ne of the principal purposes of the Sierra Club is to protect and conserve the
national resources of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.' ",20 Justice
Douglas reasoned that the Disney development would surely
thwart this purpose of the Club; therefore, the Club was " 'suffi-

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

405 U.S. 727 (1972).
See id. at 728-30.
See id. at 741.
Id. at 735-36.
See id. at 734-35.
See id. at 741-53.
Id. at 744.
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ciently aggrieved' to have 'standing' to sue on behalf of Mineral
2
King." 1
Most significant was Justice Douglas' argument that argued for
creating standing before federal courts and agencies:
in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is
the subject of outrage. Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their
own preservation ....This suit would therefore
be more prop22
Morton.
v.
King
Mineral
as
labeled
erly
Justice Douglas' dissent went further than to opine that the
members of the Sierra Club had standing to sue to prevent environmental damage. 23 He argued that the environment itself had
standing to sue for its own protection and for the benefit of future generations. 24 Justice Douglas likened a suit on behalf of the
environment to an in rem suit in the name of a ship.2 5 He suggested that guardians could be appointed to represent the environment and any of its unknown beneficiaries, in the same way
that representatives are appointed to represent minors, the incompetent, or the indigent.2 6 In effect, Justice Douglas' dissent
implicitly recognized a basic right to a clean and healthful
environment.
B.

The Ninth Amendment Argument

In the 1970s, environmentalists attempted to have the federal
courts specifically address the issue of whether fundamental envi27
ronmental rights are guaranteed by the Constitution.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,28 the Supreme Court held that a
Connecticut statute prohibiting the use or sale of contraceptives

21. Id.
22. Id. at 741.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 742-43.
26. See id. at 749-50.
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.").
28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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was unconstitutional. 29 The Court found that the Connecticut law
was an unconstitutional infringement on a "penumbrial" right of
privacy emanating from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, as made applica30
ble to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg explained that the
Ninth Amendment is a protection from governmental infringement of fundamental rights, which, though not specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments, nonetheless exist alongside
those rights which are delineated. 31 According to Justice
Goldberg, "[i]n determining which rights are fundamental,
judges . . . must look to the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so
rooted [therein] as to be ranked as fundamental.' "32
Encouraged by the decision in Griswold, environmentalists
hoped that, in its wake, the federal courts would hold "environmental rights" to be so basic and fundamental as to be inherent
in the Bill of Rights. 33 In a number of federal court cases, plaintiff-environmentalists argued that certain fundamental environmental rights are guaranteed in the Bill of Rights under the "penumbra theory." They urged that man has a basic, fundamental
right to live a healthy life and to enjoy the environment in which
he lives. Therefore, although the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights do not specifically mention environmental rights, it follows that such rights are implicit to, and emanate from, the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. 34 However, no federal court has explicitly recognized a fundamental environmental right, whether
emanating from the penumbra of the Bill of Rights or

29. 381 U.S. at 499 (holding the right of privacy within marriage
to be a "fundamental and basic .'. . personal right 'retained by the
people' within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.").
30. See id. at 481-86.
31. See id.at 488.
32. Id.at 493.
33. For citations to articles, see generally RODGERS, supra note 11.
34. See VICTOR J. YANNACONE, JR. ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS &
REMEDIES ch. 3 (1972). See generally R.H. Platt, Toward ConstitutionalRec-

ognition of the Environment, 56 A.B.A. J. 1061 (1970).
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35

otherwise.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the U.S.
Army, 36 the plaintiffs, which included the Environmental Defense
Fund and the Audubon Society, sought to enjoin construction of
a government-approved dam across the Cossatot River in Arkansas. 37 The plaintiffs asserted that the proposed dam would destroy the natural integrity of the river and would deprive the
plaintiffs of their scenic, aesthetic, ecological and recreational
38
enjoyment of the river.
As part of the legal basis for their suit, the plaintiffs asserted
that:
Itihe right to enjoy the beauty of God's creation, and to live in
an environment that preserves the unquantified amenities of
life, is part of the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States ... and

is also one of those unenumerated rights retained by the people . . . as provided in the Ninth Amendment .... 39
The plaintiffs also relied upon provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) ,40 the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 4' and several other federal environmental
42
statutes.
Citing recent landmark decisions, such as Consolidated Edison
Co. of New York v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference43 and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,44 the district court agreed
that the plaintiff-environmental groups had standing to sue on
the basis of their "aesthetic, conservational and recreational
' 45
grounds, i.e., on other than direct economic interest grounds.
The court even recognized the right of the plaintiffs to sue as

35. See Mary Ellen Cusack, Comment, Judicial Interpretation Of State
Constitutional Rights to a Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 173, 173-74 (1993).
36. 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971)(mem.).
37. See id. at 730.
38. See id. at 733.
39. Id. at 739.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1994).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 661 (1994).
42. See 325 F. Supp. at 731.
43. 384 U.S. 941 (1961).
44. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
45. 325 F. Supp. at 734-36.
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private attorneys general to further the policies of NEPA.46 However, the court declined to recognize that the plaintiffs had constitutionally-protected environmental rights upon which to bring
their lawsuit.47
The court was not unsympathetic to the efforts of the plaintiffs
to obtain judicial recognition of environmental rights: "Such
claims, even under our present Constitution, are not fanciful and
may, indeed, some day, in one way or another, obtain judicial
recognition. ' 48 Nevertheless, the court found lack of precedent
for it to recognize constitutionally-protected environmental
rights. 49 It deferred to the legislative and executive branches of
government to write the laws which would provide environmental rights. 0
Again, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) sought recognition of environmental rights pursuant to the Fifth, Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments in Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v.
Hoerner Waldorf Corp.5 1 EDF brought a class action suit for injunctive relief against Hoerner Waldorf; a paper mill company.5 2 EDF
alleged that the federal constitutional rights and statutory rights
of members of the class had been violated, because Hoerner
Waldorf had been permitted to run its plant in such a way as to
emit noxious sulfur compounds into the air and to cause irrepa53
rable harm to plant, animal and human life.
In one portion of its analysis, the district court seemed to be
on the brink of recognizing a constitutionally-protected right to
a salubrious environment:
What would ordinarily appear to be a common law nuisance,
case is alleged by plaintiff to be a deprivation of the constitutional right to life and liberty.
I have no difficulty in finding that the right to life and liberty
and property are constitutionally protected. Indeed the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments provide that these rights may not
be denied without due process of law, and surely a person's
health is what, in a most significant degree, sustains life.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id. at 735-36.
See id. at 738-39.
Id. at 739.
See id. at 738-39.
See id. at 739.
3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,794 (D. Mont. 1970).
See id.
See id.
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So it seems to me that each of us is constitutionally protected
in our natural and personal state of life and health. But the
constitutional protection is against governmental action either
federal of state.
The Fifth Amendment protects against federal action and the
Fourteenth against state action. It seems clear also, although
the point has never been decided by the Supreme Court, that
the Ninth Amendment is a limitation upon the powers and
conduct of the federal government and by the Fourteenth
Amendment such limitation is extended to the power of the
54

state.

This decision by Judge Murray is, arguably, the closest any federal court has ever come to recognizing a constitutionally-protected right to a healthful and clean environment.
After reviewing the facts and pleadings of the case, however,
Judge Murray found that there were no allegations of "federal
action" that could lead to a violation of the plaintiffs' Fifth
Amendment and Ninth Amendment rights.5 5 He also found that
the state of Montana had taken neither affirmative nor permissive state action in relation to the paper mill plant which would
constitute a violation of the plaintiffs' rights pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. 56 The court dismissed the constitutional
and statutory claims of the plaintiffs because no allegations of
federal or state action were alleged.57
Whereas the Hoerner Waldorf case came close to recognizing
constitutionally-protected rights to a clean and healthful environment, other federal courts have not cited the dictum in Hoerner
Waldorf.
In Ely v. Velde,58 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin construction of
a penal facility in an historic neighborhood. Suit was brought
against a federal agency, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and the Director of the Department of Welfare and Institutions for the State of Virginia, pursuant to NEPA and the National Historic Preservation Act.5 9 An ancillary claim was made
against Virginia's Director of Welfare and Institutions that he
had violated the plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights by his

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
See id.
See id. at
See id. at
451 F.2d
See id. at

20,795.
20,794-95.
1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
1132-33.
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"unreasonable and arbitrary action" that would result in environ60
mental degradation.
While the court held that the federal agency was bound to
comply with NEPA when planning the prison, 61 the court refused
to extend a federal constitutional right to a protected environment to the plaintiffs:
We decline the invitation to elevate to a constitutional level the
concerns voiced by the appellants. While a growing number of
commentators argue in support of a constitutional protection
for the environment, this newly advanced constitutional doctrine has not yet been accorded judicial sanction; and appel62
lants do not present a convincing case for doing so.
Perhaps the opinion by federal District Court Judge Noel, in
Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 63 best elucidates the reasoning of the
federal courts as to why the courts will not recognize a federal
constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment.
George W. Tanner and his family, residents of Harris County,
Texas, sued petroleum refineries in the area for injuries and
damages he and his family suffered as a result of the air pollution emitted by the defendants' refineries. 6 As the legal basis for
their suit, the Tanners cited the United States Constitution in its
entirety; the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; the
Ninth Amendment; the Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction
with the Civil Rights Act of 1871;65 NEPA and the general federal
66
question jurisdictional statute.
Turning to the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment claim, the court
noted that counsel for the plaintiffs conceded that there was no
precedent for the plaintiffs' claim that:
[t]he right to a healthy and clean environment is at the very
foundation of this nation and guaranteed by the laws and Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs maintain that their right
not to be personally injured by the action of the defendants
and their right to non-interference with their privacy and the
67
air they breathe are protected by the Ninth Amendment.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. at 1139.
See id. at 1135.
Id. at 1139.
340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
See id. at 532.
See id. at 534.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994); see 340 F. Supp. at 534.
340 F. Supp. at 534.
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The court found no reported cases in which the Ninth Amendment had been construed to embrace environmental rights. In
fact, the court cited the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Engineers case, 68 and others, 69 for the proposition that "the
Ninth Amendment, through its 'penumbra' or otherwise, embodies no legally assertable right to a healthful environment." 70 The
court suggested that the plaintiffs were inviting it to legislate,
71
and the court would decline the offer.
In elaborating why the plaintiffs had no cause of action pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act,
Judge Noel noted that "there has been something of a boom recently in . . 'grandiose claims' of the right of the general populace to enjoy a clean environment." 72 He referred to the efforts
by Representative Richard L. Ottinger to pass a federal environmental amendment which would mandate a clean and healthful
environment. 73 Judge Noel quoted remarks made by Representative Ottinger as support for his position that there is no precedent for constitutionally-protected environmental rights pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment or any other portion of the Bill
of Rights:
We are frank to say that such a provision to the Constitution
would have been meaningless to those attending the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia almost 200 years ago. Indeed,
this amendment would have been altogether unpersuasive
twenty years ago, although the handwriting was then visible on
74
the wall, if one cared to look for it.
Finally, the court proffered the reason why courts are hesitant to
recognize environmental rights:
[F] rom an institutional viewpoint, the judicial process, through
constitutional litigation, is peculiarly ill-suited to solving
problems of environmental control. Because such problems frequently call for the delicate balancing of competing social in-

68. 325 F. Supp. at 728.
69. Cf Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 381 F.2d 908, 925
(D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1967).
70. 340 F. Supp. at 535.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 535.
73. See id.; infra Part II.B.
74. Id. at 536 (quoting Remarks of Representative Richard L. Ottinger of New York, 114 CONG. REc. 17,116 (1968) (also quoted in Platt,
supra note 34, at 1062)).
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terests, as well as the application of specialized expertise, it
would appear that their resolution is best consigned initially to
the legislative and administrative processes. Furthermore, the
inevitable trade-off between economic and ecological values
present a subject matter which is inherently political, and which
of 'governis far too serious to relegate to the ad hoc process 75
ment by lawsuit' in the midst of a statutory vacuum.
In other words, in the absence of clear legal and historical precedent for basic constitutional environmental rights, the courts
fear being drawn into political, scientific, social and economic
battles of the moment. From a scientific or technical standpoint,
the courts feel inadequate to define what is a healthful or clean
environment. The courts would prefer to let the legislatures and
the administrative agencies define these terms. The basic holdings of Ely v. Velde, EDF v. Corps of Engineers, and Tanner v. Armco
Steel-that there are no constitutionally-protected environmental
rights pursuant to the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments-have been applied consistently by the federal courts
since these decisions.

C.

76

The First Amendment Argument

A number of legal scholars have proposed that the First
Amendment to the Constitution is another possible source of
constitutionally-protected environmental rights. 77 The Supreme
Court has recognized that the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment also encompass other basic rights of individual expression, self-fulfillment, attainment of knowledge and truth, access to information and participation in democratic decision-

75. Id. at 535-36.
76. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 475 F.
Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y 1979); Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363
F. Supp. 1061, 1063-65 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); see also Concerned Citizens
of Neb. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 970 F.2d 421
(8th Cir. 1992); Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F.
Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
77. See generally David Sive, The Environment: Is It Protected by the Bill
of Rights?, Civ. LIB., Apr. 1970, at 3; Jennifer D. Jones, Comment, A New
Paradigmfor Protection: First Amendment Principles and the Environment, 69
WASH. L. REv. 183 (1994).
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7

making.
Environmental scholars argue that preservation of the environment is essential to one's individual rights of self-realization, of
one's right to learn and to discover truth and of one's right to
participate fully in our democracy; and these rights are all necessarily implied by the language of the First Amendment. 79 If the
natural environment is destroyed, the individual loses his chance
to learn from the environment, to restore his soul from nature's
inspiration, to gain valuable knowledge about science, medicine
and history, and to gain information from the environment
80
which will make him an informed citizen.
This First Amendment theory of environmental rights has
been tested in a limited way in only a few cases involving preservation of American Indian sacred grounds.8" In Lyng v. Northwestern Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,8 2 the Supreme Court made
clear that it would not recognize environmental rights to be inherent in the First Amendment at any time in the near future. 3
Of the many issues in the Lyng case, the one relevant to this
discussion was whether a plan by the Forest Service to harvest
timber and construct a road in the Chimney Rock area of the
Six Rivers National Forest, a traditionally sacred area to three
American Indian tribes, would violate the Indians' rights under

78. See Jones, supra note 77; see also Board of Education, Island
Trees v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (rights of students to information
within a school library); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supreme Court, 457
U.S. 596 (1982) (right of the press to access information); Police Dep't
of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (right to picket as a mode of
self-expression).
79. See Jones, supra note 77, at 184.
80. See RODGERS, supra note 11, at 64-66; Jones, supra note 77, at
196-203.
81. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988); see also Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp.
1471 (D. Ariz. 1990) (following Lyng exactly, in holding Indian tribes'
First Amendment rights were not violated by a U.S. Forest Service plan
for uranium mining operations in a national forest, which contained
the Indians' sacred religious sites).
82. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
83. See id. at 452.
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the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.8 4 The government had conceded that its plans "could have devastating effects
85
on traditional Indian religious practices.
The Supreme Court noted that the Indians' religious practices
are inextricably bound to the land and nature. 6 It also noted
that "successful use of the [area] is dependent upon and facilitated by certain qualities of the physical environment, the most
important of which are privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting."" Acknowledging that the road and timber cutting
could significantly interfere with the Indians' religious practices,
the Court, nonetheless, held this to be necessary "incidental interference" by the government in its administration of the federal lands and not an "indirect coercion or penalties on the free
exercise of religion, [or an] outright [prohibition which is] subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment."88 The Court held
that the government's right to the use of its own land takes precedence over the spiritual interests of the Indians in that land.8 9
The government's activities in the Chimney Rock area might curtail the Indians' enjoyment of the land and essentially their religious practices, but the government's actions would not rise to a
First Amendment infringement, as long as the government was
not curtailing the Indians' religious practices deliberately.90
The Lyng case did not decide the exact issue of whether the
First Amendment encompasses individual environmental rights.
However, the Court's refusal to recognize the supremacy of the
Indians' First Amendment religious rights over those interests of
the federal government to manage its lands, indicates that the
Court is not receptive to finding environmental rights in the
words of the First Amendment.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See id. at 441-42.
Id. at 451.
See id.
Id. at 442 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 450.
See id. at 453.
See id. at 453-57.
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ATTEMPTS TO AMEND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION TO PROVIDE
FOR A RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT

A. The Nelson Amendment
In 1968, Senator Gaylord Nelson proposed an amendment to
the United States Constitution which read as follows:
Every person has the inalienable right to a decent environment.
The United States and every State shall guarantee this right. 91
In the late 1960s, most Congressmen were not yet concerned
with environmental issues and did not consider themselves "environmentalists." Senator Nelson later recalled that he had difficulty raising interest among politicians for most environmental
issues. 92 There was a lack of appreciation of the magnitude of
many of the environmental problems. 93 Philip Shabecoff credits
Senator Nelson with the creation of Earth Day, April 22, 1970, in
order to raise the American consciousness about environmental
problems:
"I thought, my God, why not a national teach-in on the environment?" Returning to Washington, he enlisted the support of
Republican Congressman Pete McCloskey of California to make
the effort bipartisan, found space in the offices of Common
Cause, and began hiring a staff, headed by Denis Hayes, then a
Howard Law School student, to help organize Earth Day. The
money came from Nelson's speaking fees, a few personal and
corporate contributions, and a small amount given in response
to an advertising appeal. April 22 was chosen, Senator Nelson
explained, because it was when most colleges around the country were neither on holiday nor in the middle of
94
examinations.

Earth Day 1970 was a success for the environmentalists. As had
been the case for the Vietnam War, civil rights and feminism, the
environmental movement ignited student interest. 95 More importantly, the consciousness of the American people was raised by
Earth Day, and the public began to give its support to the environmental movement. In response, politicians began calling
themselves "environmentalists," at least in name if, not in fact.
91. H.R.J. Res. 1321, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); see Cusack, supra
note 35, at 175-76.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See
See
Id.
See

SHABECOFF, supra note 5, at 1.14-15.
id.
at 115.
id. at 116.
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The environment was now in vogue. 96
In honor of Earth Day, 1970, Senator Nelson again introduced
his constitutional amendment for a "right to a decent environment."97 The resolution again failed to win support for passage. 98
B.

The Ottinger Amendment

Also in 1970, then Representative Richard Ottinger (D-NY) 99
proposed his own amendment, which elaborated on a constitutional right to a clean environment:
Sec. 1. The right of the people to clean air, pure water, freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic qualities of their environment shall
not be abridged.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall, within three years after the enactment of this article, and within every subsequent term of ten
years or lesser term as the Congress may determine, and in
such a manner as they shall by law direct, cause to be made an
inventory of the natural, scenic, esthetic and historic resources
of the United States with their state of preservation, and to provide for their protection as a matter of national purpose.
Sec. 3. No Federal or State agency, body, or authority shall be
authorized to exercise the power of condemnation, or undertake any public work, issue any permit, license, or concession,
make any rule, execute any management policy or other official
act which adversely affects the people's heritage of natural resources and natural beauty.100
Congressman
Committee. 101

Ottinger's

bill was never reported

out of

96. See id. at 116-28.
97. S.J. Res. 169, 91st Cong. (1970) (co-introduced with Sens.
Alan Cranston and Claiborne Pell); see also Lynton Caldwell, Beyond
NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REv. 203, 225 (1998).

98. See Schlickeisen, supra note 12, at 183.
99. Richard Ottinger, who is an attorney and a life-long environmentalist, is now the Dean of Pace University Law School, in White
Plains, New York.
100. H.R.J. Res. 1205, 91st Cong. (1970); see Cusack, supra note 35,
at 176.
101. See Interview with Dean Richard L. Ottinger, Pace Univ. (Nov.
6, 1997).
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In a recent interview, Dean Ottinger explained that, at the
time, he was trying to do his part to influence the burgeoning
environmental movement and to show the American people the
importance of preserving the environment.1 0 2 He had been
elected to his congressional seat on environmental issues, and he
felt a responsibility to be a force in Congress for environmental
conservation.0 3 He admits that his attempts at passage of an environmental constitutional amendment were not "successful," but
he does not consider his efforts to be a "failure," since the proposed amendment had a "moral force" at the time.10 4 His efforts
helped to raise the Congress and the American people's awareness of environmental issues. Dean Ottinger suspects that a constitutional amendment was not considered more carefully by
Congress because Congress had already begun to pass landmark
federal environmental legislation which would specifically address
many of the environmental problems then in the forefront. 01 5
C.

Landmark Environmental Legislation

From 1969 to 1980, a great deal of landmark environmental
legislation was enacted. 06 During this period, it appears that the

102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See SHABECOFF, supra note 5, at 129-36; Lazarus, supra note 8,
at 311. E.g. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988 (FIFRA), Pub. L. 100-532, 102 Stat. 2654 (codified in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Toxic Substances Control Act of 1974
(TSCA), Pub. L. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1534 (1995); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
(CZMA), Pub. L. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972
(MMPA), Pub. L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) (Superfund Act),

Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-677 (1995); Federal Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA), Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.) (now the Clean Water Act

(CWA)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (CAA), Pub. L. 95-95, 91
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need for a general, perhaps ambiguous, constitutional amendment guaranteeing a "decent," "clean" or "healthful" environment was superseded by a wealth of specific, federal environmental legislation designed, in many cases, to micro-manage
environmental problems. Consequently, most Congressmen believed that an amendment was not necessary. Moreover, environmental laws passed by Congress might be changed by court interpretation of a subsequent environmental constitutional
amendment. Thus, Congress preferred to avoid exposing all environmental laws to constitutional interpretation by not adopting
an amendment. 107
A second reason why a constitutional amendment failed to
pass the Congress at this time is that these amendments are necessarily vague and undefined. What did Senator Nelson mean by
a right to a "decent" environment? Is a "decent" environment as
"healthful" as Congressman Ottinger's "clean air" and "pure
water"? How clean must the environment be to be "healthful"?
What does it mean to "preserve" and to "protect" .our "natural,
scenic, esthetic and historic resources"? Would this amendment
allow any change or degradation of natural resources? Which
natural resources? How much degradation is too much? Like the
federal courts in the Ninth Amendment and First Amendment
environmental cases cited above, 108 Congress, not surprisingly,
has preferred to address environmental problems piecemeal,
rather than to face the attendant difficulties in trying to change

Stat. 685 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1974 (SDWA), Pub. L. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Noise Control Act of 1972 (NCA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1995); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 (Bureau of Land Management Organic Act) (FLPMA), Pub. L. 94579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43

U.S.C.).
107. See Ottinger interview, supra note 101; Schlickeisen, supra note
12, at 182-84.
108. See supra Part I.B-C.
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the United States Constitution in order to recognize environmental rights and issues.
D.

Recent Efforts
Although efforts are presently being made to pass an environmental amendment to the federal Constitution, the current
movement lacks the enthusiasm which the movement had in the
early 1970s.
1. The Brodsky Amendment and CLEAN
The most significant recent efforts to pass an amendment are
those of New York State Assemblyman Richard L. Brodsky, a
Democrat from Westchester County. Assemblyman Brodsky is
Chairman of the New York State Assembly Committee on Environmental Conservation. He has been an outspoken supporter of
environmental causes for many years in New York State. 0 9
Assemblyman Brodsky is a Co-Chair, together with State Delegate Leon G. Billings of Maryland and State Senator Richard L.
Russman of New Hampshire, of an organization he founded
called "CLEAN," or the Coalition of Legislators for Environmental Action Now.1 10 CLEAN has been characterized as a "bipartisan coalition of state legislators [that have] agreed that decisive action must be taken to guarantee present and future generations the right to a clean and healthful environment.""' CLEAN
purports to have support from legislators in forty states who have
agreed to sponsor state resolutions that request Congress to send
CLEAN's proposed "Environmental Rights Amendment" to the
2
states for ratification.1

109. See Interview with N.YS. Assemblyman Richard L. Brodsky
(Nov. 18, 1997).
110. See Letter of Support to CLEAN (Mar. 26, 1997) (from the
file of Assemblyman Richard L. Brodsky).
111. See CLEAN, The Constitutional Amendment for Environmental Rights (1997) (on file with Assemblyman Richard L. Brodsky) [hereinafter CLEAN, Position Paper (file)].
112. See CLEAN, The Constitutional Amendment for Environmental
Rights, available at Pace University School of Law Virtual Environmental
Law Library (visited Nov. 30, 1997) <http://www.law.pace.edu/env/summary.html> [hereinafter CLEAN, Position Paper (Internet)].
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CLEAN is seeking to pass the Environmental Rights Amendment by the same method used to pass the previous twenty-seven
amendments. The amendment would be proposed by a twothirds vote in both houses of Congress and sent to the states for
ratification by three-fourths of the states. CLEAN does not support using the second method of amending the federal Constitution-that is, by the calling of a constitutional convention)' 3 The
main reason why CLEAN does not want a constitutional convention is because a convention would expose the federal Constitution to additional amendment, which CLEAN is not advocating.
Also a general constitutional convention would undoubtedly divert attention from the Environmental Rights Amendment to
other issues. Thirdly, there would be virtually no support in this
country for exposing the Constitution' to an overhaul at a constitutional convention.
CLEAN feels that a federal constitutional amendment is essential because in recent years environmental protection laws have
been under attack from critics who would like to see them weakened and repealed. In its position papers, CLEAN refers specifically to attempts by United States Congressmen to repeal or
emasculate federal environmental statutes and to decisions by
the United States Supreme Court which have weakened environmental rights and protections." 4 CLEAN is particularly disturbed
by proposals in Congress to make all new environmental regulations subject to economic cost-benefit analyses. CLEAN sees this
as an attempt to "compromise public health standards without
regard to what science identifie [s] as necessary to protect human
health." 15 CLEAN also finds repugnant the attempts by certain
congressmen to "gut" the Clean Water Act and to repeal, or at
least emasculate, the Endangered Species Act. u 6 CLEAN fears for
the survival of the present federal environmental statutes and
regulations in what it characterizes as an anti-environmentalist,
pro-business and pro-property rights Congress. 7

113. See id.
114. See id.; CLEAN, Position Paper (file), supra note 111.'
115. See CLEAN, Position Paper (file), supra note 11 i.
116. CLEAN, Position Paper (Internet), supra note 112; see Letter
of Support to CLEAN, supra note 110.
117. Interview with Richard L. Brodsky, supra note 109. See generally
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CLEAN is also upset by recent Supreme Court rulings. According to CLEAN, "[t he Court has quietly but radically undermined the constitutional foundation on which thirty years of federal law is based.""' 8 CLEAN is outraged by recent Supreme
Court decisions declaring "unconstitutional lawsuits by private individuals to compel states to carry out environmental responsibilities" and eliminating "Congress' authority to require states to
adopt policies essential for achievement of national environmental standards."1 1 9 Finally, CLEAN feels that the Supreme Court
has begun to reinterpret the Commerce Clause of the Constitution in ways that are a threat to environmental protection.
CLEAN notes that:
[M]any of the federal laws protecting public health and the environment are premised on Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. In a reversal of many earlier rulings, the Supreme Court has suggested that it could reject federal laws that
attempt to protect public health, safety and welfare if it believes
the objectives of these laws could be accomplished by states acting alone. 120
Basically, Assemblyman Richard Brodsky and his organization,
CLEAN, feel that this proposed Environmental Rights Amendment will be the only line of defense against Congressional and
Supreme Court attempts to turn back the progress in environmental protection gained over the last thirty years.
Supporters of Brodsky and CLEAN are also concerned about
those environmental problems that still have not been adequately addressed in the United States, such as global warming
and biodiversity.' 21 Supporting organizations worry about the environmental legacy we are leaving to future generations. They
feel that these problems will never be addressed in the presentday political climate of the United States.122 Brodsky's supporters
feel that an environmental constitutional amendment "may be
our only effective long-term recourse" to compel Congress to act

CLEAN, The Constitutional Amendment for Environmental RightsQuestions and Answers (1997) (on file with Assemblyman Richard L.
Brodsky) [hereinafter CLEAN, Questions & Answers].
118. CLEAN, Position Paper (file), supra note 111.
119. Id.
120. CLEAN, Questions and Answers, supra note 117.
121. See Letter of Support to CLEAN, supra note 110.
122. See id.
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on new problems and to preserve our present-day environmental
123
protection laws.
CLEAN's proposed environmental rights amendment reads as
follows:
The natural resources of the nation are the heritage of present
and future generations. The right of each person to clean and
healthful air and water, and to the protection of the other natural resources of the nation, shall not be infringed upon by any
person.124

The proposed amendment is very short and similar to the
amendments proposed by Senator Nelson and Congressman Ottinger nearly thirty years ago. Unfortunately, Brodsky's proposed
amendment is subject to the same criticisms which have been
raised against previously proposed environmental rights amendments: its terms are vague and undefined, and the amendment
may confuse environmental issues when it is construed in relation to other environmental laws and regulations already
adopted. 125
Support for Assemblyman Brodsky's amendment is mixed
among environmental groups. At least sixty environmental
groups from throughout the nation have written to CLEAN
pledging their support for the amendment. These supporters include state and local Audubon societies, Sierra Clubs, student environmental action coalitions, and many other local environmental groups and societies. 126 Despite the show of enthusiasm for
the amendment by Brodsky and the other members of CLEAN
during the fall election of 1996, CLEAN has had little success in
having the proposed amendment resolution passed in the state
legislatures. Furthermore, the CLEAN movement has had lukewarm support from the major environmental groups and
organizations. 127

123. See id.

124. CLEAN, Position Paper (Internet), supra note 112.
125. See supra Part II.C.
126. See Letter of Support to CLEAN, supra note 110.
127. See Editorial, Another Constitutional Amendment, HARTFORD CouRANT, Oct. 17, 1996, at A14; Environmental Advocates, Bill Descriptions
(visited Nov. 25, 1997) <http://www.envadvocates.org/public_html/
vg97/billdescrip.htm>; Environmental Advocates, Letter from the EA
Board President (last modified Jan.
6,
1998)
<http//
www.envadvocates.org/publichtml/letter.html>; Sierra Club, SC Action
#277 -State Legislators Seek Constitutional Amendments (last modified Sept.
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Other Recent Efforts

In April 1990, in honor of the twentieth anniversary of Earth
Day, the National Wildlife Federation launched a campaign to
pass an "environmental quality" amendment to the United States
Constitution. 128 The Wildlife Federation circulated petitions calling for the amendment. The group planned " 'a serious effort'
to get the proposal before state legislatures this year. ' 129 The
Wildlife Federation's campaign, however, was criticized by some
environmental groups as a waste of money and effort on a lost
cause. 130 Presently, the National Wildlife Federation is giving far
greater 'attention to the "takings" issue, the Endangered Species
31
Act and biodiversity.1
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), which has been at
the forefront in launching legal challenges in the courts on a variety of environmental issues, is not presently involved in any effort to pass an environmental rights amendment. In his Director's Message, the Executive Director of EDF listed EDF's four
major goals for the coming year to be: global warming, protect32
ing the oceans, protection of human health, and biodiversity.

26, 1996) <http://www.sierraclub.com/news/sc-action/1996/0133.html>.
128. Tony Mauro, Some Want an Amendment to Protect the Environment, USA TODAY, Apr. 24, 1990, at 8A.

129. Id.
130. Telephone interview with Jeff Jones, Communications Dir.,
Envtl. Advocates (Nov. 24, 1997). Environmental Advocates (EA) is one
of the most influential environmental organizations in New York State.
From its offices in the State Capitol of Albany, EA serves as a watchdog
and lobbyist for all major environmental issues, legislation and actions
pending in the state. See Letter from the EA Board President, supra note

127.
131. See National Wildlife Fed'n, Takings Bills Could Cost Taxpayers

Billion$ (last visited Nov. 30, 1997) <http://www.nwf.org/nwf/nwf/nwf/
nwf/lands/akings/takfiscl.html>; see also Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings
Bills Threaten Private Property, People and the Environment, 8 FORDHAM
ENVrL. L.J. 521 (1997); Glenn P. Sugameli, The Endangered Species Act
(ESA) and the Fifth Amendment, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming

1998).
132. See Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Directors Message: New
Strategies Plan Will Focus EDF on Four Key Goals (Vol. XXVIII, No.5, EDF
Letter) (last updated Nov. 1997) <http://www.edf.org/pubs/EDFLetter/1997/Nov/adirector.html>; EDF, The Birth of Environmentalism
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Whereas an environmental amendment necessarily could encompass all these issues, EDF does not suggest an amendment as one
of the solutions to these problems.
In the Fall of 1996, members of CLEAN staged a number of
press conferences, touted as "A National Round-Up," to announce that state representatives (members of CLEAN) would be
introducing resolutions in their state legislatures requesting that
Congress pass the proposed Environmental Rights Amendment
133
and send it back to the states for ratification.
Although Assemblyman Brodsky succeeded in passing a resolution in support of the proposed environmental amendment in
the New York State Assembly on June 16, 1997,134 the resolution
has not been introduced in the State Senate. 135 The Senate is
controlled by a Republican majority which is not sympathetic to
the resolution, and Assemblyman Brodsky has no apparent strat136
egy for inducing the Senate to pass it.
In addition, resolutions in support of the proposed Environmental Rights Amendment have been passed in the Rhode Island State Senate 37 and the New Hampshire State Senate. 138 According to CLEAN, resolutions were also passed in the Alabama
1 39
House and the Louisiana House and Senate.
III.

ENVIRONMENTAL AMENDMENTS TO STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Prior to the 1970s, many states had constitutions which contained environmental provisions. New York State, for example,

<http://www.edf.org/aboutedf/
30,
1997)
(visited
Nov.
f%5Fbirthof.html>; EDF, EDF's Mission (visited Nov. 30, 1997) <http://
www.edf.org/AboutEDF/gmishstat.html>; EDF, Where It All Began (visited Nov. 30, 1997) <http://www.edf.org/AboutEDF/d_history.html>.
133. See CLEAN, Position Paper (Internet), supra note 112.
134. A. 502, 220th Ann. Sess. (N.Y 1997) (passed June 16, 1997).
135. See Brodsky Interview, supra note 109.
136. Environmental Advocates maintains that the resolution has
no chance of passing, given the Senate's present make-up. See Jones Interview, supra note 130.
137. S. 347, 1997-98 Legis. Sess. (R.I. 1997) (passed Apr. 22, 1997);
H.R. 5791, 1997-98 Legis. Sess. (R.I. 1997) (introduced Feb. 4, 1997).
138. S.J. Res. 3, 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1997) (passed Mar. 6, 1997).
139. See CLEAN, Position Paper (file), supra note 111.
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has had environmental provisions in its constitution since 1894.140
New York's is the earliest state constitutional provision, and it
created the Adirondack Forest Preserve.14 1 Within the past thirty
years many states have revised their constitutions, in whole or in
part, and have included environmental provisions. 42 Like the
Congress, the state legislatures also passed sweeping state environmental legislation in the 1970s and 1980s. Often the legislation mimicked federal legislation. A good example is the state
143
"Little NEPA" laws, which are state versions of NEPA.
But the states went further than to just mimic the federal legislation. Most states have amended their state constitutions to include environmental provisions. There are several reasons why
constitutional provisions have been easily passed on the state
level, whereas it has been impossible, so far, to pass a provision
on the federal level.

140. N.Y CONST. art XIV, §§ 1, 2 & 5 (derived from N.Y CONST. of
1894, art. VII, § 7 (as amended)).
141. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State
Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS LJ.
863, 871 (1996).
142. See also Cusack, supra note 35, at 181 (citing Robert A. McLaren, Environmental Protection Based on State ConstitutionalLaw: A Call
For Reinterpretation, 12 U. HAw. L. REv. 123, 126 (1990)). E.g. ALASKA
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-7; CAL. CONST. arts. X, § 2, X(A), §§ 1-3, XIV, § 3;
COLO. CONST. art XVIII, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7; HAw. CONST. art.
IX, § 8, art. XI, §§ 1, 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; LA. CONsT. art. IX,
§ 1; MASS. CONsT. art. XCVII; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 54; MONT. CONST.
art. IX, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 21; N.Y.
CONST. art. XIV, §§ 4, 5; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 36; OR. CONST. art. XIH, § 6; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17; TENN. CONsT. art.
XI, § 13; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59; UTAH CONsT. art. XVIII, § 1; VA.
CONsT. art. XI, §§ 1-2.
143. See, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 21,000 et seq. (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); Hawaii Environmental Policy Act (HEPA), HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 343-1 to 343-8 (1993);
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
30, §§ 61-62H (Law. Co-op. 1995); New York State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), N.Y ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117
(McKinney 1997); North Carolina State Environmental Policy Act
(SEPA), N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to 113A-13 (Michie 1994). See generally David Sive, National EnvironmentalPolicy Act, "Little NEPAs," and the

Environmental Impact Assessment Process, C127 A.L.I.-A-BA 1191 (1995).
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First, the process for amending state constitutions is generally
easier than the process for amending the federal Constitution.
Most states require a majority vote in both state legislative houses
to propose an amendment, and a majority vote in a popular
election to ratify the amendment. 144
Second, it is generally easier for state residents to reach a consensus on issues to be amended in a state constitution than it is
for Americans to reach a national consensus to amend the federal Constitution. Often environmental problems are regional,
145
and state voters want "something done" about them.
The ease with which state residents amend their state constitutions when environmental problems and other issues are raised
has led many legal scholars to criticize state constitutions for being no more than "superlegislation . . . no different in quality or
type from ordinary laws." 146 Critics charge that many state constitutions are too "policy specific." A good constitution just shapes
the general process of government, as does the United States
47
Constitution, without laying out specific policy directives.
This section reviews how most states have taken the approach
of amending their constitutions to include many policy-specific
environmental provisions. It analyzes whether this approach has
brought state residents any greater environmental preservation
and protection than is enjoyed by all Americans under the federal Constitution, which contains no environmental provisions at
all.
A 1996 survey found that "all but 18 state constitutions currently include one or more . . . substantive environmental provisions." 48 Each year there are dozens of proposals throughout the
states to add new substantive environmental provisions to state

144. See Cusack, supra note 35, at 180. See, e.g., N.Y CONST. art.
XIX, §§ 1-2. For example, the Adirondack Forest Preserve constitutional provision has been amended ten times since 1941. See N.Y
CoNsT. art. XIV, § 1 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1998) (annotation).
145. See Thompson, supra note 141, at 864.
146. Id. at 863-64.
147. See Jose L. Fernandez, State Constitutions, Environmental Rights
Provisions, and the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A Political Question?, 17 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 333, 340 (1993).
148. Thompson, supra note 141, at 868.
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constitutions. 49 Legal scholars, as well as the courts, have differing opinions as to how to categorize the various environmental
provisions contained in state constitutions.
State provisions fall into three main categories: public access
and use provisions, policy statements, and individual rights (to a
clean or healthful environment or a similar right).
A.

Public Access and Use Provisions

According to the 1996 survey, 50 over a third of all state constitutions contain public access and use provisions which guarantee
the public access to and rights in navigable waters, tidelands,
water use, or other use of natural resources of the state.15 ' Public
access and use provisions are generally the oldest type of provision found in state constitutions and they are derived from the
legal thought associated with the ancient "Public Trust Doctrine."' 52 The Public Trust Doctrine has been incorporated into
American law from the country's beginnings. 53 For examlle, the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 states that:
The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and Saint
Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be
common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants
of the said territory as to the citizens of the United States, and
those of any other States that may be admitted into54 the Confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty therefore.
In Light v. United States,155 the Supreme Court recognized the
Public Trust Doctrine, which is the rationale behind the public
access and use provisions contained in more than a third of the
state constitutions.

149. See id. at 866.
150. See supra note 148.
151. See Thompson, supra note 141, at 868.
152. See id.
153. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA
L. REv. 631, 633 (1986); Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine
From Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 185, 185 (1980);
Thompson, supra note 141, at 868.
154. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government
art. IV, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
155. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
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The Alaska, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana and
Washington constitutions have public use or public access constitutional provisions stating that submerged and tidal lands are
state public domain. 5 6 For example, article X, section 3 of the
California Constitution provides in part:
All tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city, city and
county, or town in this state, and fronting on the water of any
harbor, estuary bay, or inlet used for the purposes of navigation, shall be withheld from grant or sale . . .provided, how-

ever, that any such tidelands, reserved to the State solely for
street purposes, which the Legislature finds and declares are
not used for navigation purposes ... may be sold ... subject to

such conditions as the Legislature determines are necessary...
157
in order to protect the public interest.
Whereas California's constitutional public trust provision for
tidal lands allows the state legislature to make exceptions for the
building of streets, Hawaii's constitution declares, without exceptions: "The lands granted to the State of Hawaii . . . shall be

held by the state as a public trust for native Hawaiians and the
general public."'5 8
Eight states have provisions ensuring free access to navigable
waterways. 59 For example, Alabama's constitution reads:
That all navigable waters shall remain forever public highways,
free to the citizens of the state and the United States, without
tax, impost, or toll; and that no tax, toll, impost, or wharfage
shall be demanded or received from the owner of any merchandise or commodity for the use of the shores or any wharf
erected on the shores, or in or over the waters of any navigable
streams, unless the same be expressly authorized by law.16°
Several states ensure fishing rights to their citizens. The California Constitution reads:
The people shall have the right to fish upon and from the public lands of the state and in the waters thereof, excepting upon
lands set aside for fish hatcheries, and no land owned by the

156. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. X, § 3; FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 11; GA. CONsT. art. I, § 3; HAw.CONST. art. XII, § 4; LA.
CONsT. art. IX, § 3; WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; see Thompson, supra

note 141, at 869.
157. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 3.
158. HAW. CONsT. art. XII, § 4.

159. See Thompson, supra note 141, at 869.
160. ALA CONST. art. I, § 24.
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State shall ever be sold or transferred without reserving in the
people the absolute right to fish thereupon; and no law shall
ever be passed making it a crime for the people to enter upon
the public lands within this State for the purpose of fishing in
any water containing fish that have been planted therein by the
State; provided, that the Legislature may by statute, provide for
the season when and the conditions under which the different
species of fish may be taken. 6'
Whereas the California Constitution is verbose, the Alaska Constitution ensures fishing rights to its citizens in one concise sentence: "Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife,
62
and waters are reserved to the people for common use.
One final type of "public trust" provision establishes and preserves various state land reserves. The New York State
Adirondack Forest Preserve is the oldest of these land preserve
provisions. 63 The present-day amended version reads in part:
The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest lands. They shall not be leased, sold or
exchanged . . .nor shall the timber thereon be sold, removed
or destroyed ....
At their strongest, public access and use provisions emphasize
the public trust doctrine that common resources are held in
trust by the state for its people. Most of these provisions restrict
the state's ability to sell or lease the specified public lands. State
courts have often construed these provisions to be a restriction
upon the state's ability to license certain common resources,
65
such as fishing licenses.

B.

Policy Statements

Nearly all state constitutions that have environmental provi66
Most of
sions also include environmental policy statements

161. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 25.
162. ALAsKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
163. See N.Y CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1, 2 & 5 (derived from N.Y
CONST. of 1894, art. VII, § 7 (as amended)); Thompson, supra note 141,
at 871.
164. N.Y CONsT. art. XIV, § 1.
165. See Thompson, supra note 141, at 869-70.
166. See id. at 871.
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these policy statements have been included'deliberately. 67 Sometimes, courts have interpreted unclear environmental constitutional provisions to be policy statements. 6 For example, Michigan's constitution defines the state's environmental policy thus:
The conservation and development of the natural resources of
the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of
the people. The legislature shall provide for the protection of
the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pol169
lution, impairment and destruction.
Similarly, Virginia's Constitution reads:
To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the
use and enjoyment for recreation of adequate public lands, waters, and other natural resources, it shall be the policy of the
Commonwealth to conserve, develop, and utilize its natural resources, its public lands, and its historical sites and buildings.
Further, it shall be the Commonwealth's policy to protect its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the
170
people of the Commonwealth.
Most state environmental policy provisions set environmental
"goals" for the state, the public, and usually the legislature.' 7'
These goals always concern preserving and protecting natural resources. 72 Like the Michigan provision quoted above, these policy provisions often call upon the state legislature to pass addi'7
tional legislation to implement the stated goals.
The New York State Constitution is unique in that it is the
only state constitution that provides for citizen suit enforcement
of the other environmental provisions in the constitution. 74 New
York's constitutional environmental policy statement reads in
part:
The policy of the state shall be to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty and encourage the develop-

167. See id.
168. See id.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

MICH. CONsT. art. IV, § 52.
VA. CONsT. art. XI, § 1.
See Thompson, supra note 141, at 871.
See id.
See id.
See N.Y CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
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ment and improvement of its agricultural lands.... The legislature, in implementing this policy, shall include adequate
provision for the abatement of air and water pollution and of
excessive and unnecessary noise, the protection of agricultural
lands, wetlands and shorelines, and the development and regulation of water resources. The legislature shall further provide
for the acquisition of lands and waters, . . .which because of
their natural beauty, wilderness character, or geological, ecological or historical significance, shall be preserved and adminis175
tered for the use and enjoyment of the people.
Section 5 of article XIV provides that "[a] violation of any of the
provisions of this Article [XIV] may be restrained at the suit of
the people or, with the consent of the supreme court in appellate division, on notice to the attorney-general at the suit of any
citizen."17 6 Thus, arguably, the New York State Constitution provides for citizen suit enforcement of New York's environmental

policies. 177
Generally, state courts have held state environmental policy
provisions without accompanying enforcement provisions to be
non-self-executing.1 78 That is, they are merely goals and aspirations of the state's citizenry and legislature. As such, they do not
give individuals the right to sue to prevent environmental damage, the right to recover for damages, or the right to compel
state agencies to take action to conserve or preserve the environment. The courts have held that state legislatures must pass additional enabling legislation in order to give these provisions force
and effect. 1 79 The issue of self-execution of environmental constitutional provisions leads to the final category of state environmental provisions: those that purport to convey individual environmental rights.

175. Id. § 4.
176. Id. § 5.
177. See Thompson, supra note 141, at 872.
178. See infra Part III.C.
179. See Cusack, supra note 35, at 182-84; Thompson, supra note
141, at 871-73.
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C.

Individual Rights to a Clean and Healthful Environment: Are
These Provisions Self-Executing?
1. Hawaii Cases
Many state constitutions have provisions which suggest individual environmental rights, but court interpretation has often
blunted their 0qefulness to environmentalists by rendering them
"vague" or "non-self-executing." Article XI, section 9 of the Hawaii Constitution states:
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including control of pollution and conservation, protection and
enhancement of natural resources. Any person may enforce this
right against any party, public or private, through appropriate
legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.180
On its face, the Hawaiian provision appears to bestow an individual right to "a clean and healthful environment."'1 81 It is essentially the same type of provision that Senator Nelson and Congressman Ottinger had tried to pass for the federal Constitution
in the early 1970s. l1 2 To forestall the criticism that the standards
of environmental quality are vague and unenforceable, the provision defines a clean and healthful environment, "as defined by
laws relating to environmental quality."1 83 "Each person" is said
to have these environmental rights, and "any person may enforce
18 4
this right against any party, public or private."'
However, the federal district court, in Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Lewis,' S5
held that a private right of action did not exist under article XI,
section 9 of the Hawaii Constitution to persons trying to prevent
construction of a highway which would endanger certain species
of birds. 186 The defendants in this case included both the United
States Department of Transportation and the Director of the Department of Transportation of the State of Hawaii. Whereas the
district court held that a Hawaiian statute was controlling in rela180. HAw. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
181. Id.
182. See supra Part II.A-B.
183. HAw. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
184. Id.
185. 538 F. Supp. 149 (D. Haw. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 740
E2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. -1108 (1985).
186. See 538 F. Supp. at 175.
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tion to a portion of the federal lawsuit, it held that article XI,
section 9 was not controlling. 187 The court also stated that article
XI, section 9 does not afford a private right of action, but it gave
8
no reason for its finding. 1
In a second federal case, Fiedler v. Clark, 89 Fiedler, a private individual, sued the pineapple growers, dairy farmers, the State of
Hawaii and the United States for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the use of heptachlor and the contamination of dairy
products with the pesticide. 90 Jurisdiction was alleged under several federal statutes, including the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),'9' and under the Hawaii State
Constitution. 192 The district court had dismissed the complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 1 93 The court of appeals held that the federal statute
which Fiedler had pleaded did not create private rights of
action. 194
Concerning Fiedler's claim under the citizen suit provision of
the Hawaii Constitution, the district court had held that the
states have no power to enlarge or contract federal jurisdiction
and that the Hawaiian Constitution did not enlarge the subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. 195 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this ruling, as well. 196 The court of appeals did not address the issue of whether article XI, section 9 provides a private
cause of action in Hawaii state courts. This issue had been raised
and decided in the Stop H-3 Ass'n case. The court of appeals,
however, did concede that the legislative history of article XI,
section 9 suggests that the legislature was attempting to remove
97
barriers to standing to sue.
In the few reported cases in which the Supreme Court of Hawaii has construed article XI, section 9, the court has held that
the provision does afford private individuals the right to sue to

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See id.
See id.
714 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1983).
See id.
7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -13 6y.
HAw. CONST. art XI, § 9; see 714 F.2d at 77.
See 714 F.2d at 78.
See id. at 79.
See id. at 79-80.
See id. at 80.
See 714 F.2d at 80; 538 F. Supp. at 175.
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enforce environmental laws. In Life of the Land v. Land Use
Comm'n of State of Hawaii,'9" an environmental organization challenged a reclassification by the State Land Use Commission of
certain lands which were not owned by any of its members. 199 Although the plaintiffs did not have an ownership interest in the
lands, the supreme court held that the plaintiffs did have standing. 200 It recognized that plaintiffs' "aesthetic and environmental
interests" were enough to show standing to sue because "their
aesthetic and environmental interests are 'personal' and 'special'. 120 ' The court identified article XI, section 9 as the source
of the "personal and special interests or 'rights' " asserted by the
20 2
plaintiffs.
Again in the 1996 decision of Richard v. Metcalf,20 3 the Supreme
Court of Hawaii cited to its Life of the Land decision and affirmed
its position that article XI, section 9 of the Hawaiian Constitution
2°4
provides individual standing to sue for environmental damage.
Finally, in a very recent opinion, Kahuna Sunset Owners Ass'n v.
Mahui County Council, 205 the Supreme Court of Hawaii again affirmed that article XI, section 9 gives the Hawaiian people the
right to bring lawsuits to enforce environmental laws. 20 6 Kahuna
Sunset Owners was a suit regarding a Hawaii statute, section 60725.207 This statute awards attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in
civil actions for injunctive relief, when one private party sues another private party who has been undertaking development of
land without obtaining the permits or approvals required by
208
law.
The legislative history of section 607-25 reveals that it was
passed to enable private individuals to serve as private attorneys
general. This aids the overworked state and county agencies in
stopping illegal development by private parties. 20 9 In reviewing

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

623 P.2d 431 (Haw. 1981).
See id. at 437.
See id. at 441-42.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 441 n.10.
921 E2d 169 (Haw. 1996).
See id. at 173 n.7.
948 P.2d 122 (Haw.1997).
See id. at 124-25.
HAW. REv. STAT. § 607-25 (1993).
See 948 P.2d at 123.
See id. at 124-25 (discussing SEN. STAND. COMM. REP. No. 480-
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the legislative history of section 607-25, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii noted that it was passed by the state legislature to improve the ability of individuals to sue for environmental damage
and protection pursuant to article XI, section 9 of the Hawaii
Constitution. 210 Whereas article XI, section 9 gave:
the public standing to use the courts to enforce laws intended
to protect the environment ....
the public has rarely used this
right and . . . there have been increasing numbers of after-thefact permits for illegal private development .... [T] he impediment of high legal costs must be reduced for public interest
groups by allowing the award of attorneys' fees .... 211
The court held that a plaintiff who prevails in a lawsuit against illegal development shall be awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to
section 607-25. A defendant who prevails against a plaintiff shall
be awarded attorneys' fees only if the plaintiff's lawsuit is adjudged frivolous. 212 The Supreme Court of Hawaii implicitly recognized the rights of private individuals to sue pursuant to article XI, section 9 for environmental protection.2 13
Review of the Hawaiian line of cases is pertinent to the discussion of the development of environmental constitutional amend21 4
ments for several reasons. Analysis of the Fiedler v. Clark
and
2
15
the Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Lewis opinions reveals the tendency of the
federal courts to reject the merits of constitutional environmental claims. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has
given an expansive interpretation to article XI, section 9. As the
court explained in Kahuna Sunset, it intends to look at the legislative history of constitutional environmental provisions and any
accompanying legislation and to give the provisions the full
meaning intended by the state legislature.2 1 6 It also appears from
the Kahuna Sunset decision that the Supreme Court of Hawaii
will uphold the award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs who sue pursuant to article XI, section 9, whenever there is legislation au-

86, reprinted in 1986 SENATE JOURNAL 976).
210. See id. at 124.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 125.
213. See id. at 124.
214. 714 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1983).
215. 538 F. Supp. 149 (D. Haw. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 740
E2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985).
216. See 948 P.2d at 124.
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thorizing attorneys' fees. 217
The Hawaiian example of how the high court has worked with
the state legislature to give effect to the state's environmental
constitutional provisions is, undoubtedly, the type of working relationship that Senator Nelson and Congressman Ottinger hoped
for when they proposed their constitutional amendments to the
federal Constitution.
2.

Pennsylvania Cases

Hawaii is an exception, however. Most state courts have been
more tentative and contradictory on the issues of whether state
environmental constitutional provisions are self-executing and if
they provide for individual rights and standing. Perhaps the bestknown and classic example of state court confusion on these issues is the line of Pennsylvania cases interpreting Pennsylvania
Constitution article I, section 27.218 It reads similarly to the Hawaii provision:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values
of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are
the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefits of all the
219
people.
The 1973 case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower220 is undoubtedly the best known of any state
court opinion which has construed the meaning of a state environmental constitutional provision. There was national interest
in this case because it involved possible alteration, even desecra221
tion, of the Gettysburg Battlefield.
National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc. (Tower Corporation), had plans to construct a 307-foot tourist observation tower
near the Gettysburg Battlefield. 222 After negotiations with the
Tower Corporation, the National Park Service was willing to per-

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See id.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
Id.
311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973).
See id. at 590.
See id. at 589.
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mit the tower construction. 2 3 However, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania filed suit against the Tower Corporation to enjoin
construction because the tower would be " 'a despoliation of the
natural and historic environment.'"224 The National Park Service
then changed sides and assisted the Commonwealth in its oppo225
sition to the tower.
The Commonwealth's only basis for suit in this case was article
I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania State Constitution, which had
been ratified by the voters on May .18, 1971.226 The Commonwealth's entire ability to prevent the tower, therefore, rested on
whether the new provision was self-executing. 227 Did the Pennsylvania legislature have to pass additional legislation in order to
vest the rights of article I, section 27 in the people?
In a rather convoluted line of reasoning, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that article I, section 27 was not selfexecuting. 228 First, the court conceded that none of the other
twenty-six sections of article I ever had been declared to be nonself-executing. 229 The court attempted to distinguish section 27
from the other sections on the grounds that the first twenty-six
sections are all "limitations" on the power of the state government; whereas, section 27 also "expands" the powers of the state
government by declaring it to be "trustee" of the resources of
the Commonwealth and by directing it to " 'conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.' "230 The court then
admitted that the Commonwealth always had been the trustee of
the state's resources and that this portion of section 27 was
"merely a general reaffirmation of past law." 231
What particularly seemed to bother the court was that section
27 would allow suit on purely "aesthetic or historical
considerations":
Now, for the first time, at least insofar as the state constitution
is concerned, the Commonwealth has been given power to act
in areas of purely aesthetic or historic concern. The Common-

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See
Id.
See
See
See
See
See
Id.
Id.

id.
at 589-90.
id. at 590 n.1.
id. at 590-91.
id. at 591.
id. at 592-95.
id. at 591-92.
at 592.
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wealth has cited no example of a situation where a constituto
tional provision which expanded the powers of government
232
self-executing.
be
to
held
was
individuals
act against
In another odd passage, the court held that the governor and
the attorney general were not authorized to sue on behalf of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for environmental preservation. 233 Section 27 named the "Commonwealth" as the trustee of
the State's resources, but it did not specify who could bring suit
in the name of the Commonwealth.2 34 The court held that it violated the balance of powers among the three branches of state
government for the governor and the attorney general to assume
the authority to bring suit against the defendants pursuant to article I, section 27.235 Also, although the reasoning was not developed, the court indicated that it was concerned that holding section 27 to be self-executing would affect property rights within
2 36
the state.
Finally, the court indulged in a little gratuitous decisionmaking for a few other states when it compared Pennsylvania's
section 27 to similar constitutional amendments enacted in Masdeclared
sachusetts, 237 Illinois, 231 New York, 239 and Virginia. 2402 4It
1
them all to be "obviously not self-executing" as well.
The majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was unmoved
by the aesthetic and historical arguments of the Commonwealth.
In a concurring opinion, one justice agreed with the trial court's
findings that "(t)he Commonwealth [had] failed to show by
clear and convincing proof that the natural, historic, scenic and
aesthetic values of the Gettysburg area [would] be irreparably
harmed by the erection of the proposed tower at the proposed
site.' ",242 Portions of the opinion reveal that the justices may have
been unsympathetic to the Commonwealth's cause because the
National Park Service had first negotiated a settlement with the

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239:
240.
241.
242.

Id.
See id. at 593.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 594; MASS. CONST. art. XLIX.
See 311 A.2d at 594; ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2.
See 311 A.2d at 594; N.Y CONST. art. XIV, § 4.
See 311 A.2d at 594; VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2.
See 311 A.2d at 594.
Id. at 596 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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Tower Corporation and then switched sides. 24 3
Whatever the majority's true feelings in this case, it is fair to
say that it is not a well-reasoned opinion. What is the state Attorney General's job, if it is not to sue on behalf of the Commonwealth? In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Jones said, "the
Court has chosen to emasculate a constitutional amendment by
declaring it not to be self-executing." 244 At the end of his dissent
he concluded that:
[T]he proposed structure will do violence to the 'natural,
scenic, historic and aesthetic values' of Gettysburg. This Court's
decision today imposes unhappy consequences on the people
of this Commonwealth. In one swift stroke the Court has disemboweled a constitutional provision which seems, by unequivocal
language, to establish environmental control by public trust
and, in so doing consequently sanctions the desecration of a
245
unique national monument.
Three years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed itself in Payne v. Kassab,246 and held that article I, section 27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution is self-executing, at least in terms of
the duties of the Commonwealth to uphold the public trust of
natural resources. 247 Plaintiffs, Marian Payne and others, brought
suit against municipal and state officials to enjoin a street widening project in Wilkes-Barre. 24s The court held that the plaintiffs
had standing to bring suit pursuant to section 27 to compel the
Commonwealth to conserve the public trust of natural resources. 249 In this case, these resources were a historic River
Commons area, part of which would have been taken for the
proposed road widening. 250 The court gave virtually no reason
why it was reversing its Gettysburg Tower decision. It seemed satisfied that both the plaintiffs and the defendant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, were in agreement that section 27 was
self-executing and that the plaintiffs had standing to bring suit.
The court entirely ignored the issue of self-execution. 25 1

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See id. at 590 n.1.
Id. at 596 (Jones, CJ., dissenting).
Id. at 599.
361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
See id. at 272.
See id. at 267.
See id. at 272.
See id. at 264.
"We see no need, in this case, to explore the difficult terrain
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Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed itself on
the question of self-execution, Kassab is far from a clear victory
for Pennsylvania environmentalists. First of all, the court reserved
the question as to whether section 27 would be self-executing if
the Commonwealth:
as trustee [were] seeking [to use section 27] to curtail or prevent the otherwise entirely legal use of private property on the
ground that the proposed use impinges, in the words of the
scenic, historic and esamendment's first sentence, on 'natural
2
thetic values of the environment.'
In other words, the court might not hold section 27 to be selfexecuting, if it were to be used against private property owners.
The court may require further legislation to flesh-out how the
provision will affect private property rights.
Second, the court adopted a test that limits the effectiveness of
253
section 27 to citizen plaintiffs who sue the Commonwealth.
The Supreme Court adopted a three-part balancing test which
had been devised by the lower appellate court, the Commonwealth Court, in this case.2 54 This test requires a reviewing court
to evaluate and balance three factors every time it adjudges
whether or not the Commonwealth has honored the public trust
pursuant to section 27:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth's public natural resources?
(2) Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce
the environmental incursion to a minimum?
(3) Does the environmental harm which will result from the
challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits
to be derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an
2 55
abuse of discretion?
The environmental harm versus public benefit analysis required
by this three-part test gives a reviewing court a basis for justifying
almost any threat to the environment.

of whether the amendment is or is not 'self-executing.' " Id. at 272.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 273.
254. See id.; see also Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1973), decree nisi aff'd, 323 A.2d 407 (1974), aff'd, 361 A.2d 263 (1976).
255. 361 A.2d at 273 n.23.
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The completely different ways in which the Supreme Court of
Hawaii and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have interpreted
similarly-worded state environmental constitutional provisions illustrates the problems environmentalists face, not only in getting
environmental constitutional provisions passed, but also in
breathing life and efficacy into these provisions. The Supreme
Court of Hawaii is the exception, as one of the few state courts
which has made it a policy to research and carry out legislative
intent when it interprets state environmental constitutional provisions. It has readily interpreted the state constitutional provisions
to be self-executing.25 6 At the other extreme (especially at first)
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disregarded legislative intent by
declaring the Pennsylvania constitutional provision to be nonself-executing, 257 and it outraged the nation by permitting a
tower to be built near the Gettysburg Battlefield. Although the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court later relented, in somewhat caustic
terms, its three-pronged balancing test and restrictive holding
took the real "teeth" out of the constitutional provision.
Certainly the inclusion of environmental provisions in most
state constitutions has not been the panacea that environmentalists had hoped for.258 The vast majority of state environmental

provisions read like policy statements, 2 9 and the courts generally
have interpreted them to be non-self-executing. 260 They require
further enabling legislation in order for either the state or its cit261
izens to bring suit to enforce environmental rights or duties.
In general, however, state environmental provisions have been
interpreted by the state courts to give state citizens more individual environmental rights than they would have been accorded in

the absence of these provisions. 262 Citizens of most states have
some individual environmental rights pursuant to their state con256. See Richard v. Metcalf, 921 P.2d 169, 173 n.7 (Haw. 1996).
257. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 594-95 (Pa. 1973).
258. See Bruce Ledewitz, The Challenge of and Judicial Response to,
Environmental Provisions in State Constitutions, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST.
CONST.

L. 33, 33-42 (1991).

259. See supra Part III.B.
260. See Fernandez, supra note 147, at 338-57; Ledewitz, supra note
258, at 342-54.
261. See Cusack, supra note 35, at 181-89; Thompson, supra note
141, at 871-74.
262. See Ledewitz, supra note 258, at 33-44.

AN ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS

1997]

stitutions, whereas the United States Constitution affords no envi2
ronmental rights.

63

The trend of state supreme 'courts in recent years to interpret
their state constitutions to afford more individual rights to their
citizens than the federal courts recognize under the federal Constitution has been termed the "new federalism. "'2 64 It has been
suggested that the new federalism is a reaction by state courts to
the predominantly conservative stance of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, which have refused to extend individual rights
through constitutional interpretation. 265 The differing approaches
of the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Hawaii in regard
to article 11, section 9 of the Hawaii State Constitution clearly il2
lustrates the new federalism. 66
D.

The Present Trend to Pass Environmental Constitutional
Amendments at the State Level

Although there does not seem to be much national interest in
passing a federal constitutional amendment, in the states there
continues to be great interest in passing state environmental constitutional amendments. In recent years, during each election period, many states have had propositions on their ballots to
amend their state constitutions to include environmental provisions.2 67 The focus of these state amendments is different from
the focus of the state amendments adopted in the 1970s. In the
1970s, the states passed environmental constitutional provisions
to encompass broad environmental policies and in order to give
state citizens individual environmental rights.

26

Most of the state

amendments proposed in recent years deal with narrow environmental issues that are topics of debate or controversy within the
269
particular state.

263. See id. at 33-34.
264. See Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of PostIncorporationJudicial Review: 1985 Survey of State ConstitutionalIndividual
.Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 317, 317-23, 339-41 (1986).
265. See id. at 317-23, 339-41.
266. See supra Part III.C.
267. See John Kennedy, Few Items are Bound for Ballot in November,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 23, 1996, at B1.
268. See sources cited supra note 142.
269. See Fernandez, supra note 147, at 386; Kennedy, supra note
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For example, environmental groups in Florida, including an
organization called "Save Our Everglades" worked for years for
an amendment to the Florida Constitution that would impose a
penny-per-pound tax on raw sugar production and would create
a trust fund with the tax money collected to clean-up the Everglades. 270 Environmental groups charged the agricultural industry, particularly the huge sugar-growing industry, with destroying
the Everglades with agricultural run-off. 271 For years, a feud raged
between the environmentalists and the sugar industry. Large
amounts of money were funneled into campaigns for both sides,
and the legislature was influenced by special interests on both
sides.

272

Finally, the environmentalists were successful in placing a constitutional amendment proposition on the November 1996 ballot.27 3 Critics of the amendment charged that the proposition was
really just legislation and that it should be included in a statute
rather than in the Florida Constitution. 274 It is fairly easy in Florida to use the petition process to place propositions for constitutional amendments on the election ballot. 275 Environmentalists
felt their only hope of passing the sugar tax was by petition for a
constitutional amendment, so they took that route.276 Although it
was rather easy for proponents to raise the requisite signatures

267, at B1.
270. See Kennedy, supra note 267, at B1; Bo Poertner, Protecting
Everglades Not Just Issue-of-the-Moment for Audubon Society, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 26, 1996, at Dl.
271. See Azure, Editorial, Get Glades Settlement First, ORLANDO SENTI-

Oct. 5, 1993, at A10.
272. See Kirk Brown, Save Our Everglades, Inc. Receives $345,000 Donation, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 11, 1994, at 8A; Lloyd Dunkelberger,
Sugar Tax Amendment Defeated; Florida Referendum, LEDGER (Lakeland,
Fla.), Nov. 6, 1996, at A12; Kennedy, supra note 267, at B1.
273. See Dunkelberger, supra note 272, at A12.
274. See Tom Palmer, Battle Over Sugar Tax Reaches in Polk; The Everglades: Agriculture v. Environment; The Amendments, LEDGER (Lakeland,
Fla.), Oct. 18, 1996, at Al; Peter Wallsten, League to Oppose Penny Sugar
Tax, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 3, 1996, at 7B.
275. See FLA. CONST. art XI, § 3; see also Editorial, Revise the Initiative, LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla.), Feb. 5, 1995, at 2E
276. See Palmer, supra note 274, at Al.
NEL,
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among the public, the sugar industry put large amounts of
money into a campaign to defeat the proposition on the November 1996 ballot.2 77 It charged that the radical environmentalists
were trying to unfairly burden the industry with taxes and that
ultimately the sugar consumer would pay the extra penny tax.
278
The sugar tax amendment was defeated.
Two years earlier, the environmentalists had placed a proposition on the 1994 Florida ballot for a constitutional amendment
prohibiting the use of net fishing in Florida's waters. Fishing nets
have a devastating effect on manatees, dolphins, turtles, and mullet populations. 279 Again, the environmentalists felt that they had
tried every other way to end net fishing, and they finally felt
forced to use the amendment process. The net ban was passed
280
by the Florida voters.
Eighteen states, including Florida, use the initiative process to
amend their constitutions. 2 81 In these states, the trend has been
for environmentalists to use the amendment process to adopt
constitutional amendments on very specific issues that generally
would be addressed in regular, state environmental law and regulations. 282 Environmentalists usually use the constitutional amendment process to circumvent a state legislature which will not act
upon an environmental issue or is hostile to the cause. Critics ar-

277. See Dunkelberger, supra note 272, at A12.
278. See id.
279. See Editorial, No. 3: Vote to Limit Nets, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Oct. 31, 1994, at 8A.
280. See id.; Palmer, supra note 274, at Al; Revise the Initiative, supra
note 275, at 2F.
281. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; AR. CONST. amend. 7; CAL. CONST.
art. XVIII, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1; FLA. CONsT. art. XI, § 3; ILL.
CONST. art. XIV, § 3; MASS. CONsT. art. XLVIII; MICH. CONST. art. XII,
§ 2; MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 273; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 50; MONT.
CONST. art. XIV, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2; NEv. REV. CONST. art.
XIX, § 2; N.D. CENT. CONST. art. III, § 1; OHIO REv. CONST. art. II, § la;
OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 2; OR. CONsT. art. XVII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1; see Revise the Initiative, supra note 275, at 2F.
282. See generally Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government And
Popular Distrust: The Obstruction/FacilitationConundrum Regarding State
ConstitutionalAmendment By Initiative Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 3

(1992).
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gue that these provisions should be in state statutes, not in constitutions, but the environmentalists are driven to use the constitutional amendment process because it is expedient. Also,
environmentalists hope that if a provision is contained in the
state constitution, it will be safeguarded from simple repeal by
the legislature, as can happen with a statute which goes out of
28 3
favor.
In many states, like Florida, environmentalists are no longer
thinking in terms of broad, constitutional principles, such as the
general environmental rights contained in Congressman Ottinger's resolution of 1970 or Assemblyman Brodsky's resolution of
1997.284 Rather, they are looking for a quick fix to a specific environmental problem.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, environmentalists in New
York State opposed a proposition on the November 1997 ballot
to call for a constitutional convention to amend the New York
State Constitution.2 8 5 Although New York does not have the petition initiative process, it does have two methods of amendment.
First, if the New York Assembly and Senate pass a particular
amendment at two successive sessions of the legislature, the
amendment is placed on the general ballot for ratification by the
voters.28 6 Second, the voters can vote to hold a constitutional
convention. 287 When the question of holding a constitutional
convention came up before the voters in November 1997, the environmentalists joined with labor unions, the NAACP, the League
of Women Voters, feminists and a host of special interest groups
2
to oppose it. 88
Each of these diverse groups had a different reason for oppos-

283. See Fernandez, supra note 147, at 340.
284. See supra Parts II.B, II.D.1.
285. See Jeff Jones, Byline: A Constitutional Question; Convention Could
Risk Forever Wildland, NEWSDAY (N.Y), Oct. 21, 1997, at A43 [hereinafter
Jones, Byline].
286. See N.Y CONST. art. XIX, § 1.

287. See id. § 2.
288. See Associated Press, Ad Blitz Opposes Amendment, TIMES UNION
(Albany, N.Y), Oct. 31, 1997, at B2; Marc Humbert, Opponents Predict
Dominant Role By 'Same Old Insiders', BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 21, 1997, at IA;
Erik Kriss, Realities of Politics Intrude on Ideals, TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y), Oct. 21, 1997, at Al.
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ing the convention. 2 9 Environmental groups such as the Green
Party, 290 the Sierra Club, 291 the Audubon Society, 292 and Environ-

mental Advocates 293 feared opening up the issue of environmental rights at a constitutional convention. The environmentalists
were especially concerned that the delegates to the convention
would tamper with article 14, section 1 of the New York Constitution, which provides for the Adirondack Forest Preserve. 294 In the
end, the voters of New York defeated the convention proposition
by a wide margin, thus preventing the environmental constitutional crisis in New York which most environmental groups
295
feared.
Environmentalists should be encouraged by the trend of state
legislatures and state voters passing constitutional provisions
guaranteeing individual rights. At the same time, they cannot
help but be discouraged by the lack of clear direction from most
state courts. State environmental constitutional provisions are
often poorly-worded, unclear and ambiguous. They may be expeditiously assembled by state legislators, environmental groups and
interested citizens seeking only a quick solution to the latest environmental problem. The courts are thus caught in the middle
of political struggles when they attempt to interpret these carelessly-drafted provisions. As such, the charge that state constitutions have become nothing more than "super codes" is well-

289. See Lois Weiss, Weighing Pros and Cons of the Constitutional Convention Vote, REAL EST. WKLY., Oct. 29, 1997, at 12.
290. See Associated Press, News ftom the New York State Capitol Assoc.
PRESS. POL. SERV., Oct. 29, 1987, available in 1997 WL 2558562.
291. See Mark Weiner, Adirondack Park Fans Fear Convention: A New
State Constitution Might Not Give The Adirondacks 'Forever Wild" Protections,
POST STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y), Oct. 30, 1997 at A10.

292. See Weiss, supra note 289, at 12.
293. See Jones Interview, supra note 130.
294. See John Caher, Big Bucks Get Behind Convention Proposal, TIMES
UNION (Albany, N.Y), Oct. 9, 1997, at B2; Jones, Byline, supra note 285,

at A43; Jones Interview, supra note 130; Telephone Interview with Harry
Ross; Representative, Orange Env't (Orange County, N.Y) (Dec. 1,
1997). Orange Environment is the leading environmental advocacy
group in the author's home county.
295. See Marc Humbert, Multiple Factors Brought Down ConCon, AsSOC. PRESS POL. SERV., Nov. 6, 1997, available at 1997 WL 2560280.
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296

Finally, after reviewing various state environmental constitutional provisions and state court interpretations of them, one
must wonder if these provisions are really necessary. All of the
states have adopted environmental legislation, similar to federal
statutes, in a variety of environmental areas. Often the existence
of both a statute and a constitutional provision regarding a particular environmental subject raises the issue of which is the controlling law and in what context. Sometimes a state court will
hold a constitutional provision to be non-self-executing, partly to
end the confusion as to how to reconcile the constitutional provision and the statute. Once the constitutional provision is declared to be non-self-executing, the court can then rely on the
more specific language and requirements of the environmental
297
statute to adjudicate the case at hand.

CONCLUSION

The time for adoption of a general, environmental rights
amendment to the United States Constitution has probably
passed. However, there are three areas of environmental law in
which there may be new support for a federal constitutional
amendment: environmental justice for the disadvantaged and oppressed; international constitutional law, particularly in third
world and formerly Communist countries; and the effort to preserve biodiversity.
For a variety of social, economic, and political reasons, minorities and the poor make up the greatest percentage of Americans
who suffer the effects of living in environmentally contaminated
neighborhoods and of working in environmentally hazardous
workplaces. Typically, minorities and the poor have been unable
to sue and to recover for environmental damage. They are often
unable to make state and federal agencies respond to their environmental problems. The legal study of this problem has been
termed "environmental justice," and it is a new and growing

296. See Fernandez, supra note 147, at 33841.
297. See id. at 338-57 (discussing state cases which have held constitutional provisions to be non-self-executing).
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29
field of environmental law. 1

In order to advance the cause of environmental justice, it has
been urged that minorities should sue for their rights pursuant
to state environmental constitutional provisions. 299 In a unique
article, published in the Stanford Environmental Law Journal in
1996, Neil Popovic, an attorney for the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, makes the suggestion that minorities should sue in
state courts, pursuant to state environmental constitutional provisions, and cite international treaties and human rights conventions as precedent for their civil rights positions.3 °° Popovic notes
that state courts have often used international treaties and conventions for information or precedent in cases involving human
rights, such as cases involving prisoners. 3 1 He feels that the use
of international law to construe state environmental constitutional provisions in environmental justice cases will breathe new
life into these provisions and may revive the movement to pass a
30 2
federal environmental rights amendment.
Since the fall of Communism, formerly Communist countries
have gone about the arduous business of revising, or totally rewriting, their constitutions. 30 3 Environmental issues are of great
concern in former Eastern Bloc countries, because Communist
dictatorships payed little attention to environmental preservation.
In most of these countries the factories pollute the air, the water
is fouled by industry, and the forests and other natural resources
have been squandered. 3°4 Developing countries have also suffered
environmental damage at the hands of occupying powers or in
30
their attempt to catch up with the rest of the world.
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Because of the severe environmental damage that they have
suffered, former Communist and developing countries are disposed to adopt strong environmental provisions in their new
constitutions, including individual environmental rights provisions. 30 6 These countries often look to American law when writing and interpreting their new constitutions. 30 7 It has been suggested that the interest that other countries show in our state
environmental constitutional provisions and court decisions may
serve to redirect the attention of the American legal community
toward the adoption and use of environmental constitutional
provisions. Furthermore, the sharing of ideas may foster the de308
velopment of international environmental rights.
Finally, in an imaginative 1994 article, Rodger Schlickeisen,
President of Defenders of Wildlife, argues for an amendment to
the United States Constitution that will require the United States
to take an active role in ensuring global biodiversity. 3 9 Mr.
Schlickeisen raises the question of "intergenerational fairness."
He suggests that present generations have a moral responsibility
to preserve life on earth for the welfare of future generations. 10
He argues that the work necessary to save the world's species can
be better accomplished if the United States Constitution is
amended to contain a right to biodiversity on behalf of all generations. 3 11 Since the biodiversity problem is global in nature, he
sees a time when the world situation will require the United
3 12
States to adopt such a constitutional amendment.
Although it is not a pressing concern of environmentalists at
the moment, the movement for adoption of an amendment to
the United States Constitution, which guarantees individual environmental rights, could be revived at any time by an imaginative
environmental argument.
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